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The existence of a relationship between
“creativity” and unusual mental states has
been speculated on for centuries, with
a specific connection of “creativity” to
“mental illness” since the 1830s (Becker,
2001). However, controversy remains
about whether this relationship exists (e.g.,
Schlesinger, 2009). The main challenge in
supporting this claim is that the statement
itself is very general. In addition, there
are a number of issues that contribute to
unclarity within this literature.
One issue is the way in which “cre-
ativity” and “mental illness” are discussed.
“Creativity” is a broad construct that has
been defined and operationalized in var-
ious ways across the studies that have
attempted to examine it. This variety is
due to the fact that creativity is likely
composed of various facets (Dietrich and
Kanso, 2010), but has often been referred
to as if it is a unitary construct (see Glazer,
2009, for discussion). Similarly, “mental
illness” is a heterogeneous construct that
not only encompasses multiple symptoms
and diagnoses but reflects societal and cul-
tural definitions and norms, resulting in
changes to diagnostic criteria sets through-
out the years. Researchers have tried to
answer the question of whether a rela-
tionship between “creativity” and “mental
illness” exists, but, as would be expected
when tackling such a broad question, the
approaches of each study have differed.
In practice, both “creativity” and “men-
tal illness” have been operationalized in
every research study that has tackled this
issue by recruiting a particular population
and using a specific definition (whether
articulated or not) of creativity in order
to successfully examine the construct. But
after the conclusions have been made, the
titles and introductions of the next jour-
nal articles on the topic discuss the broad
concepts of “creativity and mental illness”
and/or cite references that studied one
facet of creativity in a population to sup-
port an association with another facet of
creativity in the same population without
an explanation of why a similar finding
would be expected. Thus, overlooking the
details of what was actually studied in pre-
vious papers and drawing support from
any study that refers to “creativity” even
though it may represent a different facet
of creativity makes it difficult to make
clear-cut statements about a relationship
between creativity and mental illness or
even whether such a broad comparison is
useful.
To foster examination of potential rela-
tionships between creativity and mental
illness, it would be prudent to use a more
systematic approach in which these con-
structs are made explicit in each study
(Prentky, 2001). Given the diverse defini-
tions and measures of creativity employed
to date, a given study should focus on
one of these definitions, describe why that
definition is appropriate for study in a
particular population, and use a measure
that taps that particular facet of creativ-
ity. For example, Glazer (2009) proposed
three possible models (1. different types
of creativity each associated with a spe-
cific psychopathology, 2. creativity as a
dimension, and 3. creativity as a unitary
construct) for the creativity construct and
how each would be associated with psy-
chopathology. Using such a framework (or
another that is similarly clearly defined)
would expedite the process of answering
the question about whether there is a
relationship between mental illness and
creativity.
Another issue that contributes to con-
fusion in the field is the use of various
“creativity measures” that measure differ-
ent facets of creativity across studies. The
results of individual studies are often gen-
eralized to an overall conclusion about
“creativity” without discussion about how
these facets may be related to each other.
A goal in a given study would be to
determine whether and how the creativ-
ity facet tested by the primary creativity
measure is related to other frequently-used
creativity measures, by including multiple
measures of creativity. Using multiple cre-
ativity measures in one study would pro-
vide data for convergent and discriminant
validity between the facets of creativity
measured in that study.
A further step in defining the facet
of creativity being studied would be to
hypothesize whether additional cognitive
mechanisms are relevant to the selected
facet of creativity. Inclusion of cognitive
measures (i.e., neuropsychological mea-
sures or behavioral tasks) that assess
these mechanisms would allow determi-
nation of whether and how much cre-
ativity and cognitive measures overlap
and allow integration and comparison of
results to other literature that involves cog-
nitive skills. For instance, Boden (2013)
suggests that an understanding of asso-
ciative pathways regarding semantic infor-
mation and its relevance to context is
important for creativity. Making semantic
associations between words or concepts
(likely associated with verbal creativity)
has been related to executive function
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and positive schizotypy (Fisher et al.,
2007, 2013), somewhat consistent with
Eysenck’s (1993) theory that psychoticism
(P) is mediated by high divergent thinking
(often referred to as an aspect of creativ-
ity) and low inhibition. Other facets of
creativity are likely related to other cogni-
tive processes (e.g., use of spatial relation-
ships, problem solving, pattern recogni-
tion, cognitive inhibition). Incorporating
cognitive measures from these fields could
help shed light on what creativity is, how
it works and whether there are multiple
mechanisms that lead to the same facet of
creativity.
In addition to both a more explicit
definition and operationalization of
creativity and investigating its associ-
ated cognitive correlates, a study would be
clearer about why a certain type of men-
tal illness is being investigated in relation
to that type of creativity. Many studies
have investigated a relationship between
creativity and the schizophrenia spectrum
(e.g., Weinstein and Graves, 2002; Fisher
et al., 2004; Folley and Park, 2005), bipo-
lar disorders (e.g., Soeiro-de-Souza et al.,
2011), hypomania (e.g., Furnham et al.,
2008), depression and anxiety (e.g., Silvia
and Kimbrel, 2010), and autism charac-
teristics (e.g., Rawlings and Locarnini,
2008; Claridge and McDonald, 2009).
However, these diagnoses differ from each
other in addition to having heterogeneous
presentations of symptoms within each
diagnosis. Thus, when considered as a
whole, it is unclear why all of these disor-
ders would be associated with creativity,
especially if creativity is a unitary construct
as it is often referred. Examining one facet
of creativity in more than one mental ill-
ness or symptom type within one study
could assist in determining specificity of
that facet to a particular symptom type. It
is more likely that one symptom or a num-
ber of symptoms in combination, either
common or unique to multiple diagnoses,
would be associated with a particular facet
of creativity than an overall diagnosis or
mental illness as a whole.
Furthermore, any facet of creativity is
unlikely to be associated with clinical lev-
els of symptoms. For instance, some of
the most consistent findings about associ-
ations between performance on creativity
measures and psychopathology-spectrum
symptoms have been in samples of
individuals with subclinical schizoprehnia-
spectrum characteristics (undergraduates
with high scores on schizotypy or first-
degree relatives of those who have been
diagnosed with a mental disorder) and not
those diagnosed with schizophrenia (e.g.,
Jaracz et al., 2012). Thus, mental illness is
likely an invalid term.
As a final note, a study that incorpo-
rates measures of creativity, cognition and
symptoms may have to rely on statisti-
cal methods that do not assume linear-
ity. Associations between cognitive skills
and a facet of creativity, between cogni-
tive skills and symptoms, and between a
facet of creativity and symptom constel-
lations are likely quite complex; thus, it
is unlikely that an association between all
three would be linear. To support this
statement, there is evidence that schizo-
typy characteristics and executive function
are curvilinearly associated with seman-
tic processing in an inverted U-shape
(Fisher et al., 2013). Similarly, Abraham
(2014) suggested that top-down control
and originality are associated in this man-
ner. These studies are akin to Nelson
and Rawlings (2010) suggesting that cre-
ativity increases with moderate schizo-
typy and decreases with increased more
serious psychopathology and Stoneham
and Coughtrey (2009) finding that high
and low schizotypy groups are faster to
solve a creative problem-solving task than
those in an intermediate schizotypy group.
Reliance on statistical methods designed to
detect linear relationships may have con-
tributed to the inconsistency of findings in
the literature. The use of more sophisti-
cated statistics that test the possibility of
other types of associations between these
constructs would allow better testing of
more complex relationships.
In summary, it is difficult to answer
whether there is a relationship between
creativity and mental illness given the var-
ious methods and populations that have
been studied in pursuit of this question.
If a more detailed approach is used to
engage this question more systematically,
we may finally be able to put this age-
old broad question to rest and instead ask
more targeted ones.
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